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Portfolio approach to information technology security resource
allocation decisions
Shivraj Kanungo
Department of Decision Sciences
The George Washington University
Washington DC 20052
kanungo@gwu.edu
Abstract
This paper presents a portfolio optimization approach to information technology (IT)
security investment decisions in an organization. This approach has been motivated by
the extreme variations that are found in IT security requirements for organizations in
addition to the diversity of starting conditions found in organizations that choose to
embark on a formal approach to managing their security. Often, a budgetary allocation
is made for IT security and IT managers and management are faced with the problem of
how to allocate these monies or resources across competing projects and products that
can potentially improve or enhance IT security in an organization. Instead of ranking or
rating the various alternatives based on their benefits only, it is demonstrated how, by
identifying organizational objectives, and then aligning the decisions with the objectives,
one can optimally allocate resources across the IT security portfolio. The approach in
this paper has been to provide a generic decision framework that can be customized by
practitioners and fine-tuned by other researchers. The approach is explained and then
the results are discussed using a case study. Both the strengths and weaknesses of this
approach are highlighted and suggestions for how this approach can be deployed and
enhanced are provided.
Keywords: IT security, resource allocation, decision theory, analytic hierarchy process,
optimization

Introduction
Spending on IT security is projected to grow by 24 percent (compounded annually)
between 2001 and 2006 (Roberts 2003). Organizations are spending heavily not only on
IT security but also on security in general. As the IS function matures, many
organizations have a formal information system plan (which may include an IT plan
also). This implies that there exists a formal IS strategy that is aligned with the
organizational strategy. In such cases, we can assume that the information security plan
would be part of the larger IS plan. By implication, since the information security plan
would be derived from, and consistent with, the IS plan, it would also be aligned with the
organizational strategy. The issue of spending on IT security is well summed up by
Levinson (2002) who quotes an IT professional, “we have no fear of spending money, but
we have to do it wisely.”
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According to Swanson et al. (2003), resource allocation responsibilities, in various forms,
reside with the head of the organization, the CIO, the security program manager and the
program manager or the system owner. The ultimate responsibility, however, resides with
the head of the organization. While Swanson et al. (2003) refer to federal government
agencies, this distribution of responsibility holds for any organization in general. The
implication of such shared and ultimate responsibility is that every decision maker and
(preferably) every organizational stakeholder needs to understand why certain decisions
were taken, how they were taken and the implications of such decisions going wrong.
The problem for any manager requesting funds is to convince budgetary authorities to
allocate the requisite resources (most typically, funds). The problem for the individual(s)
who make the allocation decision is to understand the need for such funds and then make
decisions well aware of the tradeoffs that may ensue. In essence, information security
decisions, like many decisions, need first, a transparent decision process and second, a
parsimonious way of communicating the decision framework.
In essence, IT security resource allocation decisions require significant organizational
investments. The goal of such decisions is to maximize the value of such investments
(whether one time or ongoing). The objective of this paper is to present one such decision
making framework that helps organizations analyze and understand their security
concerns in addition to helping them leverage their investments in information security.
The paper is presented as follows. First the IT security investment problem is described
and definitions of key terms are provided. Then a portfolio optimization approach to the
problem is proposed. Such and approach is justified primarily by invoking the contextual
and unique nature of IT security needs of an organization. Then the application of this
approach is presented using a real life case study to explain how the model was
developed and how the results can be interpreted. The paper is concluded by pointing out
some weaknesses of this approach as also highlighting the strengths. In addition
suggestions for improving this framework are also made.

Problem description
In an organization, information security or information technology security often rears
itself as a critical issue. This means that organizations often wake up to security problems
when they actually encounter (or expect to encounter) a security-related incident or when
a security incident has occurred in another organization that this proximal to itself
increasing the likelihood of its happening in that organization. Alternatively,
organizations can be mandated by regulatory bodies to meet minimum security standards.
Budgetary processes are instrumental in driving most investment decisions in
organizations (OMB 2005). Given that IT security-related decisions fall into the critical
category and that there is often a regulatory deadline or high opportunity cost associated
with making mistakes with such decisions, there are two, often, conflicting goals in this
decision-making situation – (a) take a decision expeditiously and, at the same time, (b)
exercise due diligence.
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The decision is often compounded by the fact that there always so much to do when it
comes to IT security simply because there are so many potential vulnerabilities in any
organizational system (not just the information system). Apart from the information
technology infrastructure (that, among other things, includes networks, databases and
applications), organizational processes have to be made secure just as people have to be
trained to change their security related behaviors. Not only does this take high initial
investment, it also requires a continuous stream of recurrent investments to reinforce and
sustain the existing standards of IT security.
As a result, the IT security investment decision is one that needs to be made every year in
order to reassess the IT security goals and realign investments (or spending) with those
goals. The nature of organizational decision-making is not perfect. Prevailing
organizational biases and tensions due to competing demands for the same set of
resources and the lack of perfect information require that tradeoffs be made and in doing
so judgments be used. Judgments are subjective and we need to encapsulate such
subjectivity in a meaningful way. For instance, when comparing two security products
(say, firewall), regardless of how carefully we develop criteria to compare them, there
will eventually remain a level of subjectivity when we compare these products based on
those criteria. More importantly, when we attempt to evaluate the “value” of an
investment in IT security such an evaluation is necessarily multifaceted and complex.
The research motivation for this paper was provided by Bodin et al. (2005) who have
identified the need for using quantitative measures (like NPV) and Gordon and Loeb
(2006) who have identified AHP as one of the approaches to resource allocation in IT
security decisions. While both papers attempt to provide a basis to make meaningful
investments for IT security, there gaps that can be addressed. For instance, Gordon and
Loeb (2006) acknowledge that the ability to accurately estimate benefits is a key factor in
using NPV effectively. However, as Rodewald (2005) has observed ROI is a poor metric
to use when comparing IT security investments to investments that yield a tangible
return. So, in this paper, a multi-attribute measure to evaluate IT security benefits is
suggested. Secondly, Bodin et al. (2005) have suggested that the ratio of benefits to costs
may be a better metric to employ when making resource allocation decisions in the
context of IT security. It is shown that such an approach may not be indeed so and that
focusing on benefits is the most optimal approach.

Methodology
Linear programming approach is combined with the analytical hierarchy process to
demonstrate how IT security investments can be effectively leveraged by an organization.
While every organization has its own specific goals IT-security related objectives, we
present a somewhat generic approach (that can be customized by other users) by
identifying three broad objectives (G1, G2 and G3) based on security service categories
shown in Table 1.
Security service
Category
Security Program (C11) Management
Security Policy (C12) (G1)

Description
Management objectives: are those that have to do with
the organization’s overall computer security program.
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Risk
Management
(C13)
Security Architecture
(C14)
Certification
and
Accreditation (C15)
Security Evaluation of
IT Products (C16)
Contingency Planning
(C21)
Incident
Handling
(C22)
Operational
Testing (C23)
(G2)

These goals are met based on how well the computer
security program and risk are managed within the
organization. These could include meeting regulatory
compliance and minimize enterprise-wide disruptions.

Operational objectives: are focused on controls
implemented and executed by people (as opposed to
systems). For these goals to be met technical or
specialized expertise that rely on management
activities and technical controls need to be in place.
These goals could include meeting a certain level of
diffusion of personal firewalls in the organization and
Training (C24)
ensuring a certain cycle time for recovering from a
virus attack.
Firewalls (C31)
Technical objectives: have to do with security
controls involving a computer system. These goals
Intrusion
Detection
depend on the proper functioning of the system.
(C32)
Technical
These goals could include an upper bound on the
(G3)
number of successful virus attacks or ensuring that a
Public
Key
certain minimum number of computers are part of a
Infrastructure (C33)
third-party authentication framework.
Table 1. Security services and goals (Adapted from Grance et al., 2003, p. 5-1)

The logic of the approach is that the resources being invested in IT security have to be
aligned with the IT security goals. Once the objectives are identified and the alternatives
identified (these are projects or initiatives that are shown in Appendix A), the criteria are
established to evaluate how well a certain alternatives meets a particular aspect of a goal.
These are shown in Table 1 in the first column. For instance the management objective
has six components. For instance C23 is the third criterion for the second goal. An
alternative is evaluated on how important it is to meeting the requirements of each
component. Based on this the decision hierarchy that we develop is shown in Figure 1.
The 8 alternatives (A1 through A8) are shown hanging from each of the criteria that have
been identified. The decision hierarchy also shows that at each node we have a
comparison matrix, the order of which is the number of elements being compared. For
instance, at the goal node, the comparison matrix is of order 3, since there are three goals
being compared.
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⎢
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Figure 1. The AHP hierarchy used to generate priorities for the eight projects shown in
Appendix A
The approach to constructing the AHP hierarchy in this paper departs from that adopted
by Gordon and Loeb (2005) in that the goal of IT security is designed to be maximally
aligned with that of the organizational goals. Hence, one does not necessarily have to
limit themselves to technical criteria. Using this approach allows an organization to adopt
a more integrative approach toward conceptualizing and budgeting for IT security. Using
this tree, relative importance of the goals is measured using pair-wise comparison. This
step is repeated for the criteria to evaluate each alternative. After prioritizing the
objectives, the IT security alternatives are scored, using either pair-wise comparisons
(which can be tedious) or absolute rating scales and utility curves (typically non-linear).
Once the final priorities for the alternatives are obtained, they are subjected to sensitivity
analysis to ensure that the judgments are valid. The complete set of results are shown in
Appendix B.
Following this, the portfolio for benefits subject to funding is optimized based on
dependency and other constraints. The typical form for this optimization would be
n

Maximize Expected value of IT security Benefits =

∑B
i =1

i

Subject to
1. Budget constraint
2. Dependency constraint (if x is funded, then y has to be funded or not funded)
3. Some projects can be partially funded while other can not be
4. Specific constraints
Where Bi is the benefit associated with the ith project. Bis can be generated as AHP
priorities (since they are generally qualitative) or by some other method. In this study
ExpertChoice version 11.1.3628 was used to generate “benefit” priorities using the AHP
hierarchy shown in Figure 1. These computations can also be accomplished using
Microsoft Excel and the built-in optimizer (the Solver Addin).
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Data and Analysis
In this section the data are presented that were be used to allocate resources among IT
security alternatives. Issues such as which projects are funded and why, what the
tradeoffs are, what the nature of those tradeoffs are, and what are the implications of
using different approaches to allocating resources for IT security initiatives are
scrutinized. Table 2 shows the benefits derived using the AHP structure shown in Figure
1 (See Appendix B). A1 through A8 are the leaf nodes for the tree shown in Figure 1. The
available budget is taken to be $200,000 (See Appendix A).
Project
Project definition
Benefit
Id
End user training (training programs and online material
A1
0.082
development)

Cost
($)
56000

A2

End user support (firewall and anti virus software)

0.124

24000

A3

Upgrade and maintain server for firewall

0.108

25000

A4
A5
A6

Revise and improve security process audit and quality office
0.078
process
Establish IT security task force (for security planning and
0.053
coordination)
Establish separate security program office (for SOX and
0.123
regulatory compliance reporting)

43000
25000
75000

A7

Security operations group training (5 programs per year)

0.073

59000

A8

Email spam filter enhancement

0.053

12000

Table 2. List of all the projects, their benefits and the associated costs
Three approaches are presented to allocated resources across IT security projects. They
include benefit maximization, benefit to cost ration maximization and maximization of
benefits using linear programming.

Benefit maximization
When attempting to maximize benefits the project that provides the maximum benefit is
chosen and selected to be funded. Then the project with the next highest benefit is picked
select to be funded and this process continues till the budget is exhausted or the next
project to be funded makes the total cost exceed the available budget. Table 3 shows that
if project A4 is funded the total allocation exceeds the budgeted amount of $200,000.
Project
Id
A2
A6
A3

Benefit Cost
0.124
0.123
0.108

24000
75000
25000

Cumulative
cost
24000
99000
124000
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A1
0.082
56000 180000
A4
0.078
43000 223000
A7
0.073
59000 282000
A5
0.053
25000 307000
A8
0.053
12000 319000
Table 3. Benefits, costs and cumulative costs for the projects sorted by benefits
Total benefits add up to 0.694 and the actual benefits (from the projects that were funded)
add up to 0.437. Similarly all the benefits to cost ratios add up to 2.218E-05 and the total
of benefits to cost ratios of projects that were actually funded add up to 1.259E-05 1.
Hence the effectiveness of this allocation from a benefit maximization perspective is
63.0% 2. Similarly, the effectiveness of this allocation from a benefit to cost maximization
standpoint is 56.8%.

Benefit/cost ratio maximization
The approach to maximizing the total of benefit to cost ratios is identical to the approach
for maximizing benefits. The primary difference is that instead of using benefits to select
projects, benefits to cost ratios are used to make the selection. Table 4 shows the projects
sorted in descending order based on the benefit/cost ratio. The project with the highest
benefit to cost ratio (in this case project A1) is chosen to be funded, followed by the
project with the next highest benefit to cost ratio and this process continues till the budget
is exhausted or till the next project to be funded makes the total allocation overshoot the
available budget. Note that by employing this approach one is able to fit in one more
projects into the available budget. While, budget utilization was not an explicit goal, this
approach has been able to increase benefits in such as way that more projects are funded.
Project
Benefit
Id
A1
0.124
A8
0.053
A3
0.108
A7
0.053
A5
0.078
A2
0.123
A4
0.082
A6
0.073
Table 4. Benefits,
benefits/costs

Benefit / Cumulative
cost
cost
24000 5.167E-06 24000
12000 4.417E-06 36000
25000 4.320E-06 61000
25000 2.120E-06 86000
43000 1.814E-06 129000
75000 1.640E-06 204000
56000 1.464E-06 260000
59000 1.237E-06 319000
costs, benefits/costs and cumulative costs for the projects sorted by
Cost

1

Actual total benefits are composed of all the benefits above the dashed line in Table 3.
Similarly actual total benefits to cost ratios are computed from the same set of projects
that are above the dotted line.
2
(0.437/0.694)*100 = 63.0%
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Using this approach and as shown in section 4.1, the effectiveness of allocation from a
benefit maximization standpoint is 59.9% and from a benefit to cost maximization
standpoint is 80.4%.

Benefit maximization with budget constraints
In this approach linear programming (LP) is used to maximize benefits subject to budget
constraints.
The canonical form of the generalized LP formulation becomes
n

Maximize IT security benefits =

∑B F
i =1

i

i

Subject to the following constraints
n

∑ C F ≤ Budget
i =1

i

i

All Fis are integers that can take a value 0 or 1
Where
Bi = benefit associated with alternative i
Ci = cost associated with alternative i
Fi = decision variable associated with alternative i
For this problem, Bis and Cis are obtained from the benefits and cost columns
respectively in Table 2. Solving for Fis, we obtain the following solution: F1 = F3 = F4 =
F5 = F7 = F8 = 1 and F2 = F6 = 0. This implies that projects/initiatives 2 and 6 are not
funded; everything else is. Using this approach the effectiveness of allocation from a
benefit maximization perspective is 71.76% and from the benefits to costs ratio
standpoint is 87.03%. Table 5 summarizes the results.

Approach

Effectiveness of allocation with
respect to
Benefits/Costs
Benefits
Ratio

Benefit
63.0%
56.8%
maximization
Benefit to cost
59.9%
80.4%
maximization
Linear
71.67%
87.03%
Optimization
Table 5. Effectiveness of three resource allocation approaches from the benefits and
benefits/costs ratio perspectives.
Table 5 clearly shows that the optimization approach is much more effective than the
either the benefit maximization or the benefits/costs maximization approach.

293

The Tenth Pacific Asia Conference on Information Systems (PACIS 2006)

Discussion
The issues of how and why one obtains better resource allocation effectiveness when we
one uses LP and why it makes sense in the context of IT security investments is taken up
for discussion. Subsequently, how this approach has been able to meet the two decision
objective that had identified in the beginning of the paper is taken up for discussion.
In terms of IT security portfolio decision effectiveness, it is clear from Table 5 that a
singular focus on IT security benefits fails to provide the most effective allocation policy
for IT security resources. Figure 2 shows a comparison of IT security resource allocation
approaches by using three efficient frontiers for each of the allocation approaches. The
numbers above the arrows show the number of projects that can be funded using a
particular approach. For instance using the benefits only approach (Section 4.1) we can
only fund four projects.

6

5

4

Figure 2. Comparative effectiveness for resource allocation strategies.
Interestingly, the approach that has been advanced by Bodin et al. (2005) is shown to be
the least effective. They propose that the ratio of benefits to costs can be used to provide
more “bang for the buck.” However, as the second efficient frontier (based on the
benefits/costs ratio) shows, the efficiency, in terms of maximizing benefits, is
consistently lower than the other two approaches. So, while the effectiveness of this
approach is more than that of relying purely on benefits to allocate resources, it is less
effective than the LP-based resource allocation approach. While this may not always be
so (Forman 2001), the LP-based benefit maximization approach makes sense because our
aim is to maximize the benefits associated with IT security. The goal in the approach
adopted in this paper is not to spend as much of the budgeted amount as possible. While
the latter may be a realistic organizational goal (to avoid budget reductions in subsequent
budgeting cycles, especially in organizations that practice zero-based budgeting), it is far
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more important to “spread” the investment. From an IT security perspective it is more
important to provide coverage for all identified areas of vulnerabilities than to optimize
one or two selected areas. Therefore, it is more effective to fund two smaller IT security
projects, the combined value for which may be (marginally) more than one large project
that may send the cumulative cost over budget.
It has been shown that the proposed method for making IT security portfolio decisions is
parsimonious. This shows that one of the goals of decision-making in the context of IT
security has been met. As mentioned in the beginning of this paper, one of the goals of
decision making in the context of IT security is to take decisions expeditiously. This
implies that a parsimonious decision making framework is needed – one that helps
decision makers take the best decision without investing unreasonable time and
resources. While there are alternative approaches as those suggested by Butler (2002),
Gordon and Loeb (2006) and Cavusoglu et al. (2004), they are encumbered by the need
to collect a large body of information that is either composed of rare events (IT security
failures and associated estimates of costs that can be attributed to such failures) or a
series of estimates.
The suggested approach is also extensible in that if, the goal was to minimize risk, then
instead of assessing benefits, risks could be expressly addressed. In addition, if benefits
are combined with risks, one could compute expected benefits. This could done so by
computing risks for each alternative using a separate AHP model and use the priorities
that are generated as probabilities of failure (p) associated with the different project. The
expected value of each of the alternatives could then be obtained by multiplying benefits
by (1-p,) the probability of success.
The approach to IT security decisions presented in this paper also meets the objective of
ensuring due diligence. Identifying the organizational IT security goals and further by
identifying the criteria that are used to evaluate how these organizational security goals
are met, not only ensures that the decision problem is fully enumerated (from a
completeness perspective), but also ensures that an organization responds to IT security
issues that are specific to its context – and not generic security that form part of the “best
practices” approach. Neubauer et al. (2005) have identified the criticality of organizationspecificity in the context of IT security related investment decisions.

Conclusion
This paper has shown how to formulate the IT security portfolio decision as one where
multiple alternatives (initiatives or projects) can to be evaluated based on multiple criteria
(some of which may be subjective) in order to meet multiple goals (many of which may
conflict with each other). A generic approach to IT security resource allocation has been
provided that is flexible and can be customized for any organization. In doing so, it has
been demonstrated how IT security investments decisions can be maximally aligned with
the organizational security goals. In addition, given the absence of a normative basis to
judge how good a decision is, it has been shown how to optimize IT security resource
allocation decisions keeping in mind the organizational context and other singularities
that are specific to the decision at hand. This work can be extended and enriched by
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incorporating constraints that are not budgetary. These include those constraints that
involve “must fund” projects, dependency constraints (if project A is funded then project
B has to be funded or if project A is funded then project B can not be funded) and
constraints that allow projects to be partially funded.
In summary, it is believed that the proposed approach to IT security resource allocation
will allow an organization to maximize the value of its IT security investments, improve
communication and alignment between IT groups, user and managers and allow It
security planners to schedule resources more efficiently.
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Appendix A: The security projects or initiatives
The eight security projects of initiatives are shown below for an operating division of an
organization that has a mature IT setup and has been according the highest importance to
IT security as a part of its larger security and IT initiative. Since it is financial institution
in a large urban setting on the east coast in the US, the $200,000 IT security budget for
recurring expenditure items is considered average 3.
Initiative
project

or

End user training
(training programs and
online
material
development)
End user support
(firewall and anti virus
software)
Upgrade
and
maintain
server
for
firewall
Revise
and
improve security process
audit and quality office
process
Establish
IT
security task force (for
security planning and
coordination)
Establish separate
security program office
(for SOX and regulatory
compliance reporting)

Description

Budget
($)

In-house and outsourced training
programs for selected end-users and their
representatives. This is an recurring activity that
needs to take place every year. The intent is to
ensure that all end users are exposed to at least
one such training program every two years.
This is part of the overall help desk
support system. This is an outsourced activity
and 2 FTEs (full time equivalent) are budgeted
for this activity.
The bundled cost for the server,
installation and testing along with the annual
cost of maintaining it is reflected.
Security processes need to be revised
constantly. One half FTE (internal) is budgeted
for this activity.
The IT security task force needs to meet
every month and take decisions on the direction
of IT security and liaise with external bodies like
regulatory agencies, standards bodies and key
business partners. The cost reflects coordination,
administrative and meeting costs.
This requires specific attention to IT
security from the standpoint of Sarbanes-Oxley
Act. This office will form the interface between
IT security, internal audit and the quality group.
One FTE and office and administrative expenses
are budgeted.

3

56000

24000

25000

43000

25000

95000

In general, organizations tend to spend 3 percent to 6 percent of total IT spending on IT
security (Wheatman et al., 2005).
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This is the set of annual training program
Security operations
for the internal IT security group professionals.
group
training
(5
Five programs attended by five persons each and
programs per year)
their travel and expenses are budgeted for.
Email spam has been a source of constant
Email spam filter problems. Enhancements of the software and
enhancement.
part- manpower are reflected in this budgeted
figure.

59000

12000

Appendix B: Screenshots for computing sample priorities

Figure B2.1. Screen showing the goal, objectives, criteria and alternatives
Figure B2.1 shows how priorities (benefits) associated with alternatives were computed.
The screenshot shows a specific scenario (not the one used for computations in the body
of the paper). The goal is shown as “Maximize IT security Portfolio.” The three
objectives have to do with meeting management, operational and technical benefits. The
criteria used to assess the extent to which requirements are met (and benefits captured)
are shown as the leaf nodes on the tree on the left. The number alongside each of the
elements shows the importance of the elements. For instance, in this case, the operational
objectives are rated as .672 while the management and technical objectives are rated as
.063 and .265 respectively. The advantage of these ratio scales is that we can say the
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operation objective is 2.5 (.672/.265 = 2.54) times more important than the technical
objective and the technical objectives are four times (.265/.063 = 4.21) more important
than the management objectives. The criteria for each of the objectives are interpreted the
same way. For instance, from a management perspective, certification and accreditation
is 1.2 (.201/.163 = 1.23) times more important than the security architecture; or from a
technical perspective, the benefits of intrusion detection (in general) is computed to be
one-third (.230/.672 = .342) as important as firewalls.
In the same way, the items on the right side of the screenshot in Figure B2.1 show the
alternatives and their priorities (benefits). The most important project (i.e. the one with
the highest relative benefits is “Revise and improve security process audit and quality
office process ” followed by “Upgrade and maintain server for firewall.” These final
ratings for benefits were produced by providing ratings for each of the alternatives based
on each of the criteria as shown in Figure B2.2.

Figure B2.2. Screen showing the alternatives and how they were rated based on each criterion
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